Is the Middle East war really coming to an end?

Everyone hopes the Middle East war will end as soon as possible. Trump's statement about withdrawing troops within three weeks, the confirmed date for his May visit to China, the passage of 10 oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, the removal of the Iranian foreign minister and speaker from the strike list, and rumors of secret US-Iran contacts… all these signals point to a high probability of a short-term end to the Middle East war. The best time to end the war was yesterday, the second best time is now. For the Trump administration, there is no benefit in continuing the war. He is not faced with a "good or bad" choice, but rather "worse or worst." Only by resolving the conflict as quickly as possible can he prevent its spillover effects from impacting the midterm elections this November, and even further affecting the 2028 presidential election. The Strait of Hormuz and the Energy Game If the war truly comes to an end, what will become of the Strait of Hormuz? Will it be blocked indefinitely? Realistically, this possibility is not high. Even if the Iranian regime does not change, its overall strength will be significantly weakened after a round of military strikes, making it difficult to rely on a strait to confront the world in the long term. More importantly, this is not just a European problem. The one that will truly bear the brunt of the pressure first is likely to be one of Iran's most important buyers, China. Europe can still source energy from other regions, but China's dependence on the Strait of Hormuz is much greater. If the waterway is blocked for a long period, the pressure on China will be more direct. Therefore, a core variable in this matter is actually China's attitude, especially how China and the US communicate and coordinate, which could become a key factor influencing the subsequent situation. Meanwhile, the United States is significantly more resilient to pressure on this issue. In recent years, the localization of US energy production has increased dramatically, and it is no longer as heavily reliant on Middle Eastern crude oil as it once was. From a supply-side perspective, even if problems arise in the Strait of Hormuz, the direct impact on the US mainland would be relatively limited; the real impact would primarily be on European and Asian countries. Of course, there is also a more ambiguous, but equally realistic, scenario: Iran may not be able to completely blockade the strait, but might resort to "charging passage," effectively extorting passing oil tankers. This approach would also cause ongoing disruption. The United States has clearly stated that it should not accept such behavior, but "whether to accept" and "whether to prevent" are two different things. In this situation, responses from different countries are likely to diverge. For example, if Iran, in order to survive, might "let China off the hook" and allow it to sail, then trade routes and flows could be reshaped. Intermediate links such as transshipment, resale, and arbitrage could emerge, potentially leading to Chinese merchants smuggling cheaply purchased oil to Europe for huge profits, further complicating the issue. The Chaotic Iranian Regime The New York Times recently published a series of reports on Iran, including several journalists who have long studied authoritarian regimes. They made a key judgment: Iran is currently highly divided, with a blurred power structure, and to some extent, a situation where "no one truly makes the final decision." According to reports, during the large-scale protests in Iran in 2019, the Iranian regime was actually on the verge of collapse, its internal state extremely fragile, but this was unknown to the outside world. On the surface, Khamenei managed to "suppress" the situation through a series of measures, making the regime appear to have stabilized and successfully weathered the crisis. The problem lies in the fact that Khamenei was killed two months earlier in the US-Israeli joint strike, and whether his son, Mojtaba, can truly take over the mess amidst the gunfire and chaos is a question no one can answer definitively. Against this backdrop, Trump's strategy becomes clearer: he is not simply negotiating with a stable government, but rather attempting to identify, and even screen, the more "pro-American" or more cooperative faction within Iran. Once negotiations are reached, the US may use external forces to support this faction to come to power. Currently, the most prestigious "potential supporter" is Reza Pahlavi. Prince Pahlavi, in exile for forty years. In 1978, at the age of 17, Pahlavi went to the United States for pilot training. A year later, in 1979, the Islamic Revolution broke out, ending the "Pahlavi Dynasty" and the "Iranian Empire," and abolishing the monarchy. Following this, the regime changed, and the country became the "Islamic Republic of Iran." He never returned and settled in the United States. For the next forty years, as the exiled crown prince, he navigated the circles of Western think tanks and media, never leaving the Iranian political scene. A name without legitimacy leads to dissent; dissent leads to failure. When an old regime collapses and new powers rise, possessing the bloodline of the original dynasty is a significant political asset. Now, Pahlavi is experiencing the most representative "highlight" of his exile. Following the killing of Khamenei in a joint US-Israeli operation at the end of February, Pahlavi launched an intensive political mobilization in March. He has repeatedly stated that his goal is not necessarily to restore the monarchy, but to give the Iranian people the freedom to choose their political system. He says he will accept a republic if the people choose it. He frequently appears in Western media and think tank events, calling on Western countries to pressure the Iranian government and supporting human rights movements within Iran (such as the recent "Women's Lives, Liberty" protests). The most pivotal event was his speech at the CPAC (Conservative Political Action Conference) in Texas on March 28, 2026, and the support rally he held in Washington that same month. At CPAC, Pahlavi's speech was highly impactful, its core message being the deep integration of Iran's future with American values. He told the audience that a free Iran would no longer be a nuclear threat, no longer support terrorism, and no longer block the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, Iran would establish strategic partnerships with the United States and Israel, potentially bringing over $1 trillion in benefits to the US economy. At the end of his speech, he even mimicked Trump's slogan, uttering the line that ignited the crowd: "President Trump is making America great again, and I'm going to make Iran great again. MIGA." He also deliberately addressed the biggest concerns from the outside world. He said Iran is not Iraq, and he would not repeat the mistakes of the "de-Baathist" campaign of the past, nor would he allow the power vacuum to escalate into anarchy. He promised to retain the existing bureaucracy and some military facilities, only eliminating theocracy at the top. Western media's portrayal has also quietly shifted this month. Fox News and The Jerusalem Post no longer describe him as a "former crown prince," but rather as "the leader of the Iranian opposition." Some Iranian Americans rallied at Copley Square, calling for the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. "Across cities, generations, and social classes, Pahlavi has become the only widely recognized and truly legitimate opposition figure, his name chanted throughout the country," an article in *The Jerusalem Post* noted. "For many Iranians, he is more than just one of many political options. He represents a clear break with the Islamic Republic and a link to the continuity of Iran's national identity." Pahlavi is not merely a symbol; he has done a great deal of substantive preparation over the past two years. In April 2025, he officially launched the "Iran Prosperity Project," a 170-page operational manual for regime transition, compiled over several years by more than 100 experts. Its core logic is to shift the focus from "how to overthrow" to "what to do from day 1 to day 180 after the overthrow," including lifting sanctions, recovering $120 billion to $150 billion in frozen assets overseas, rebuilding energy supplies, consolidating the military, and holding a national referendum. His aim is to prevent Iran from falling into anarchy like Iraq or Libya after the regime collapse. In October 2025, he released the accompanying digital mobilization platform, "We Take Back Iran." According to his team, by early 2026, tens of thousands of active-duty Iranian security forces, police, and government personnel had registered through the platform, indicating their willingness to defect in the event of regime change. The core political gamble in Pahlavi's plan to "take back Iran" was to call for the defection of the Iranian regular army (Artesh). This armed force, with approximately 350,000 personnel, exists in a parallel structure to the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) but has long been marginalized. The long-standing internal conflicts within Iran's military are another key point of entry for regime change in Iran. Within Iran, a highly militarized theocratic state, the antagonism between the Armed Forces (Artesh) and the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is not a recent phenomenon, but rather a structural cancer sown since the establishment of the regime in 1979. These two armed forces are fundamentally different in their bloodline and spirit. The Armed Forces are Iran's long-established regular army; their professional traditions, military doctrines, and even the family memories of many senior generals can be traced back to the more secular and nationalist Pahlavi dynasty. For them, protecting the "land of Darius and Cyrus" is paramount. The Revolutionary Guard, on the other hand, is a "private army" established by Khamenei and his predecessors to consolidate their power. Therefore, the Revolutionary Guard not only controls Iran's most elite missile forces and its most lucrative secret overseas accounts, but also monopolizes the country's construction, telecommunications, and energy industries through its vast commercial empire. In Tehran, the capital of Iran, a mid-level officer in the Revolutionary Guard might own a luxury mansion in the northern part of the city, while a colonel in the regular Iranian Armed Forces might be struggling to afford basic medical insurance for his entire family. This tension has escalated to a critical point during the 2026 war. According to battlefield reports from mid-March 2026, the Iranian Armed Forces undertook a significant amount of frontline air defense and territorial defense duties in response to external air attacks, but supplies were extremely scarce. Reports indicate that the Revolutionary Guard, controlling logistical lifelines, refused to provide medical evacuations for wounded Iranian Armed Forces soldiers and even intercepted ammunition. This has provoked considerable anger within the Iranian Armed Forces. There are indications that the US military is maintaining informal communication with the Iranian Armed Forces leadership through Qatar. These analyses all ultimately point to the fact that in Iran, currently fragmented into various states, the US military is identifying, waiting for, and assisting the most suitable "local regime" to regain control. The real pressure of the US midterm elections means the echoes of war will eventually reach the most practical places: gas stations. As the midterm elections approach, the negative feedback effects of the Iran war on US domestic politics are becoming apparent. A crucial variable is that support for the Iran war within the US was already low. This is a point many analysts have consistently criticized Trump for; the public relations for this war were essentially ineffective, and it could be said that an effective narrative was never established from the beginning. For ordinary Americans, they may not care about the complex logic of geopolitics, but they are very concerned about their cost of living, such as gas prices. Therefore, information is layered. For some who follow the news or are already Trump supporters, the war might seem "important" on a macro level, related to global affairs, energy, and geopolitics. But for most ordinary Americans, the impact is very concrete: an extra $100 a week on gas is more immediate than any grand narrative. Gas prices in many places have already reached $3.80, and in some areas even exceed $4 a gallon. In this context, Trump's emphasis on "this is short-term pain" is logically sound, but psychologically difficult for voters to accept. For most people, short-term pain is precisely the clearest and hardest to ignore. Whether this will translate into votes is still too early to judge. But what is certain is that inflation is eroding trust in the government, and the "kitchen economy" is once again becoming a decisive factor. From a congressional perspective, the direct impact of the war itself is limited. Influenced by economic factors such as rising oil prices, the Republican Party might lose the House of Representatives if the election were held now. However, with seven months until the midterm elections and the war still ongoing, the situation remains uncertain. Furthermore, anti-war sentiment within the United States has not formed an overwhelming consensus; those opposed to the war have not mobilized strongly, and those who are not opposed are not particularly resolute. This "middle ground" is unlikely to translate into a dramatic swing in the vote. A truly meaningful analysis will likely have to wait until June or July, breaking down the approximately 20 to 25 key swing seats one by one, to arrive at a relatively reliable assessment. While the Republicans face the risk of losing the House, the Senate situation is much more stable. If the Democrats want to truly change the situation, they need to win at least four more seats on top of their existing ones to have a substantial advantage. Winning three seats is not very meaningful, because in a 50-50 tie, the vice president's vote can break the deadlock. Therefore, given the current state structure, it will be very difficult for the Democrats to win the Senate. In states like Texas and Alaska, the Democrats have virtually no realistic chance of winning. Relatively speaking, swing states like New Hampshire have a better chance, as there is some uncertainty. North Carolina may also become a key battleground for the Democrats. Overall, the Democrats' theoretical "ceiling" is four seats, but realistically, they are more likely to gain one or two seats, and we are far from entering the most intense stage. Many states are still holding their primaries; for example, in Texas, the Democratic candidates themselves lack sufficient testing, and their past statements are constantly being dug up, all of which weaken their competitiveness. In the latter half of the 2028 election, a "divided Congress" scenario is expected: Republicans will control the Senate to retain control over personnel appointments and foreign policy, while Democrats, even if they regain control of the House, will face a "policy vacuum" due to legislative stagnation. During this period, large-scale domestic stimulus packages will be stalled due to the difficulty in passing fiscal subsidies. While this political deadlock will reduce government efficiency, from a macroeconomic perspective, it may actually strengthen US policy through unilateral executive orders, maintaining extremely strong consistency in core areas such as energy extraction and border security. Financial Market Repricing Amid the current turmoil in Iran, global macroeconomic asset valuation models are undergoing profound restructuring. The core variable in this repricing lies in the fact that the US is using its energy advantage to conduct a targeted harvesting and redistribution of global wealth. The crude oil market exhibits an extreme asymmetry: in the short term, fears of supply disruptions have supported oil prices fluctuating at historical highs, but savvy investors have already begun pricing in a post-conflict "supply glut." With the US domestic production capacity reaching its limit and Venezuela's development rights being reactivated, a Western-led new energy supply order is taking shape, meaning that the market power of Middle Eastern crude oil is facing a permanent dilution. In the currency market, the dollar's hegemonic position has not only not been weakened by the turmoil, but has been reinforced. In contrast, the euro is trapped in a long-term depreciation cycle due to energy shortages and political divisions. France and Spain's shirking of responsibility in military action not only exposed the weakness of European defense but also severely damaged market confidence in the euro. Because Europe lacks a deep energy moat like the US, this lack of economic sovereignty is translating into a currency disaster. Under the potential influence of fiscal plans such as the "Save America Act," global capital may accelerate its return to the US, seeking a safe haven amidst the geopolitical storm. The rise in gold prices in this scenario is driven by three overlapping factors: First, geopolitical risk premium. Before the Pahlavi regime truly consolidates its power, there will inevitably be a vacuum period. No one knows what Iran will ultimately become; as long as the situation remains unresolved, the Revolutionary Guard is not completely dismantled, remnants remain, and regional proxies are active, gold will maintain its high level. This driving force will continue until the situation becomes truly clear. Second, structural pressure on the dollar's credibility. Even if the Pahlavi regime is ultimately established and the petrodollar system expands, before that, the US has already experienced a costly war, a rebound in inflation, and renewed questioning of the sustainability of US finances. In this process, gold plays the role of a "fiat currency credit hedge," not just a tool for hedging geopolitical risks. Third, the structural trend of global central banks purchasing gold. This trend has been established since 2022, and the Middle East wars will only accelerate it, not reverse it. The impact on Bitcoin needs to be considered from two dimensions. The first dimension is liquidity. Falling oil prices, declining inflation, and the Fed opening up room for interest rate cuts create a macroeconomic environment of renewed liquidity easing. Historically, Bitcoin has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of every Fed easing policy, as its sensitivity to liquidity far exceeds that of any traditional asset. In this respect, Bitcoin is a clear beneficiary. Bitcoin's correlation with the Nasdaq has been quite high over the past few years. Every time global risk premiums surge—whether it's the impact of the pandemic in March 2020, the interest rate hike cycle in 2022, or any major geopolitical event—Bitcoin has not exhibited its theoretically expected "safe-haven asset" attributes; instead, it has fallen along with risky assets, and often by a larger margin. The reason is straightforward: Bitcoin's marginal holders are currently still institutional and retail investors with high risk appetites. When liquidity tightens, they prioritize selling the most volatile assets to obtain cash. Bitcoin happens to be the most volatile asset in their holdings. Therefore, in the initial stage of a war, soaring oil prices, and a collapse in global risk sentiment, Bitcoin will likely fall along with the Nasdaq, and possibly even more sharply. This is not a logical contradiction, but rather determined by market structure. The key variable for Bitcoin is not the war itself, but the Federal Reserve's reaction path. If soaring oil prices force the Fed to tighten liquidity again, Bitcoin will fall in the short term along with risk assets, and the decline could be quite dramatic. However, if the Fed is forced to compromise between inflation and recession, choosing to maintain loose monetary policy or even restart QE, Bitcoin will be one of the most direct beneficiaries.