This weekend, beset by internal and external troubles, the crypto market suffered another bloodbath. BTC is currently hovering around the Strategy holding cost of $76,000, while altcoins seem to be looking to self-destruct at the mere sight of their prices. Behind this current slump, after recent conversations with projects, funds, and trading platforms, one question has been repeatedly on my mind: What will the crypto market be trading a year from now? And the more fundamental question behind this is: If the primary market no longer produces "future secondary markets," what will the secondary market be trading a year from now? What changes will occur in trading platforms? Although the death of altcoins is a well-worn refrain, the market hasn't lacked projects in the past year. Projects are still queuing up for TGE every day, and as media, we are still frequently engaging with project teams in their marketing and promotion. (Note that in this context, when we talk about "projects," we are mostly referring to "project teams" in a narrow sense. Simply put, these are projects that benchmark against Ethereum and its ecosystem—underlying infrastructure and various decentralized applications—and are "token-issuing projects." This is the cornerstone of what our industry calls native innovation and entrepreneurship. Therefore, we will leave aside Meme and other platforms that have emerged from traditional industries venturing into crypto for now.) If we rewind the timeline a bit, we'll find a fact we've been avoiding discussing: these projects about to achieve TGE are all "existing, established projects." Most of them raised funds 1-3 years ago, and now they've finally reached the point of token issuance, or even, under internal and external pressure, they've been forced to take this step. This seems like a form of "industry destocking," or to put it more bluntly, queuing up to complete their lifecycle, issuing tokens, giving the team and investors an explanation, and then lying low and waiting for death, or spending their money in the bank hoping for a miraculous turnaround. The first tier is dead. For "veterans" like us who entered the industry in the ICO era or even earlier, experienced several bull and bear market cycles, and witnessed the industry's benefits empowering countless individuals, subconsciously, we always feel that given enough time, a new cycle, new projects, new narratives, and new TGEs will eventually emerge. However, the reality is that we are already far from our comfort zone. Let's look at the data directly. In the most recent four-year period (2022-2025), excluding special primary market activities such as mergers and acquisitions, IPOs, and public fundraising, the number of financing deals in the crypto industry showed a significant downward trend (1639 ➡️ 1071 ➡️ 1050 ➡️ 829). The reality is even worse than the data suggests; the changes in the primary market are not only a reduction in overall amount but also a structural collapse. Over the past four years, the number of early-stage funding rounds (including angel, pre-seed, and seed rounds), representing fresh blood for the industry, decreased by 63.9% from 825 to 298. This represents a larger decline than the overall market decline (49.4%), indicating a shrinking capacity of the primary market to provide funding to the industry. A few sectors showing an upward trend in funding rounds are financial services, trading platforms, asset management, payments, and AI-related cryptographic technologies, but these have limited practical relevance to us; frankly, the vast majority will not "issue tokens." Conversely, the decline in funding for native "projects" such as L1, L2, DeFi, and social networking is even more significant.

Odaily Note: Chart source: Crypto Fundraising
One easily misinterpreted data point is that while the number of funding rounds has decreased significantly, the amount of each round has increased. This is mainly due to the fact that, as mentioned earlier, "large projects" have captured a large amount of funds from the traditional financial sector, greatly raising the average. In addition, mainstream VCs tend to increase their bets on a small number of "super projects," such as Polymarket's multiple rounds of funding exceeding hundreds of millions of dollars.
... From the perspective of crypto capital, this top-heavy vicious cycle is even more pronounced. A friend outside the crypto circle recently asked me why a well-known, long-established crypto fund was raising funds, but after looking at its deck, he was puzzled and asked why its returns were "so poor." The table below shows the actual data from the deck; I won't mention the fund's name, but only extract its performance data from 2014 to 2022. As can be clearly seen, between 2017 and 2022, the fund's IRR and DPI underwent significant changes—the former represents the fund's annualized return, reflecting more of its "paper profitability," while the latter represents the multiple of cash returns actually returned to LPs. Looking at the returns across different years (vintage), this group of funds exhibits a very clear "cyclical gap": Funds established between 2014 and 2017 (Fund I, Fund II, Fund III, Fund IV) significantly outperformed in overall returns, with TVPI generally ranging from 6x to 40x and Net IRR maintained at 38% to 56%. They also already possessed high DPI, indicating that these funds not only had high paper returns but had also completed large-scale cash-outs, reaping the early benefits of the crypto infrastructure and leading protocols' growth from zero to one. Funds established after 2020 (Fund V, Fund VI, and the Opportunity Fund in 2022) showed a clear decline, with TVPI primarily concentrated in the 1.0x to 2.0x range and DPI close to zero or extremely low. This means that most of the returns remained at the paper level and could not be converted into actual exit profits. This reflects the fact that, against the backdrop of rising valuations, intensified competition, and declining project supply quality, the primary market can no longer replicate the excess return structure driven by "new narratives + new asset supply" of the past. The real story behind the data is that after the DeFi Summer boom of 2019, the primary market valuations of native crypto protocols were inflated. Two years later, when these projects actually launched their tokens, they faced a lack of compelling narratives, industry tightening, and exchanges controlling the market with last-minute term changes. Their performance was generally unsatisfactory, with some even experiencing market capitalization inversions, leaving investors vulnerable and funds struggling to exit. However, this mismatched funding could still create a false sense of prosperity in certain parts of the industry. It wasn't until the fundraising of some large, star funds in the last two years that the true extent of the damage became apparent. The fund I cited, currently managing nearly $3 billion, further illustrates that it serves as a mirror reflecting the industry cycle—performance is no longer a matter of individual project selection; the tide has turned. While established funds are struggling to raise capital these days, they can still survive, lie low, collect management fees, or shift towards AI investment, while many other funds have already closed down or moved to the secondary market. For example, Yi Lihua, the current "Ethereum King" in the Chinese market, is someone who remembers not long ago as a leading figure in the primary market, investing in over a hundred projects annually. The substitute for knockoffs has never been memes. When we say that native crypto projects are drying up, a counterexample is the explosion of memes. For the past two years, a saying has been repeatedly mentioned in the industry: the substitute for knockoffs is memes. But looking back now, this conclusion has actually been proven wrong. In the early days of the meme wave, we played with memes like we were playing with mainstream altcoins—screening numerous meme projects based on so-called fundamentals, community quality, and narrative plausibility, trying to find the one that could survive long-term, constantly evolve, and eventually grow into a Doge, or even "the next Bitcoin." But today, if someone still tells you to "hold onto your memes," you'd think they've lost their mind. The current memes are an instant monetization mechanism for hype: a game of attention and liquidity, a product of the mass production of Dev and AI tools, an asset form with an extremely short lifespan but a continuous supply. It no longer aims to "survive," but rather to be seen, traded, and utilized. Our team also has several long-term, consistently profitable Meme traders. Clearly, they focus not on the future of a project, but on its rhythm, spread speed, sentiment structure, and liquidity path. Some say Memes are no longer viable, but in my view, Trump's "final crackdown" has precisely allowed Memes to truly mature as a new asset class. Memes were never meant to be a substitute for "long-term assets," but rather a return to the essence of attention-based finance and liquidity games. It has become purer, more ruthless, and less suitable for most ordinary traders. Seeking Solutions Externally Asset Tokenization So, as Memes become more professional, Bitcoin becomes more institutionalized, altcoins decline, and new projects are about to disappear, what can ordinary investors like us, who enjoy value research, comparative analysis, and judgment, and who have speculative attributes but aren't purely high-frequency gambling on probabilities, do for sustainable development? This question doesn't just concern retail investors. It also faces trading platforms, market makers, and platform operators—after all, the market cannot forever rely on higher leverage and more aggressive contract products to maintain activity. In fact, when the entire established logic began to crumble, the industry had already begun seeking solutions externally. The direction we've all been discussing is repackaging traditional financial assets into on-chain tradable assets. Stock tokenization and precious metal assets are becoming top priorities for trading platforms. From centralized exchanges to decentralized platforms like Hyperliquid, all have seen this path as key to breaking through the current limitations, and the market has responded positively—during the most frenzied days of precious metals last week, Hyperliquid's daily silver trading volume once exceeded $1 billion, and crypto stocks, indices, and precious metals once occupied half of the top ten trading volumes, helping HYPE surge by 50% in the short term under the narrative of "all-asset trading." Admittedly, some current slogans, such as "providing traditional investors with new choices and lower barriers to entry," are premature and unrealistic. However, from a crypto-native perspective, it may solve internal problems: with the supply and narrative of native assets slowing down, old coins declining, and new coins ceasing to be available, what new trading reasons can crypto trading platforms offer the market? Tokenized assets are easier for us to use. In the past, our research focused on: public chain ecosystems, protocol revenue, token models, unlocking schedules, and narrative space. Now, our research focuses on: macroeconomic data, financial reports, interest rate expectations, industry cycles, and policy variables. Of course, we've already been researching many of these aspects for some time. Essentially, this is a shift in speculative logic, not a simple expansion of product categories. Listing gold and silver tokens isn't just about adding more currencies; what they're truly trying to introduce is a new trading narrative—bringing the volatility and rhythm of traditional financial markets into the crypto trading system. Prediction Markets Besides bringing "external assets" onto the chain, another direction is bringing "external uncertainty" onto the chain—prediction markets. According to Dune data, despite the sharp drop in crypto prices last weekend, trading activity in the prediction market remained high, with weekly trading volume reaching a new all-time high of 26.39 million transactions. Polymarket led the pack with 13.34 million transactions, followed by Kalshi with 11.88 million transactions. Regarding the development prospects and expected scale of prediction markets, we won't go into detail here. Odaily has been writing more than two articles analyzing prediction markets every day recently... You can search for them yourself. I want to talk about why we play prediction markets from the perspective of cryptocurrency users. Is it because we're all gamblers? Of course. In fact, for a long time, altcoin traders weren't essentially betting on technology, but rather on events: whether a token would be listed, whether a collaboration would be officially announced, whether a token would be issued, whether new features would be launched, whether there would be compliance benefits, and whether they could ride the next wave of narratives. Price is merely the result; the event is the starting point. Prediction markets, for the first time, break this event down from a "hidden variable in the price curve" into a directly tradable object. You no longer need to indirectly bet on whether a certain outcome will occur by buying a token; you can directly bet on "whether it will happen." More importantly, prediction markets are well-suited to the current environment of "new project shortages and narrative scarcity." As the number of newly tradable assets decreases, market attention becomes more focused on macroeconomics, regulation, politics, the behavior of industry leaders, and major industry events. In other words, while the number of tradable "asset" is decreasing, the number of tradable "events" is not decreasing, but rather increasing. This is why the liquidity generated by prediction markets in the past two years has almost entirely come from non-crypto-native events. Essentially, it introduces external uncertainties into the crypto trading system. From a trading experience perspective, it is also more user-friendly for existing crypto traders: The core questions are greatly simplified to one—will this outcome occur? And, is the current probability too high? Unlike Meme, the barrier to entry for prediction markets lies not in execution speed, but in information judgment and structural understanding. Now that you mention it, doesn't it make you feel like I could try this too? Conclusion: Perhaps the so-called cryptocurrency market will eventually disappear in the not-too-distant future, but before it does, we're still striving. As "new coin-driven trading" gradually fades away, the market will always need a new speculative vehicle that has low barriers to entry, a compelling narrative, and sustainable development. Or rather, the market won't disappear, it will only migrate. When the primary market no longer produces the future, what the secondary market can truly trade are these two things—the uncertainty of the external world and the trading narrative that can be repeatedly reconstructed. Perhaps all we can do is adapt in advance to yet another shift in speculative paradigms.