Crypto User's Wallet Drained After Hotel WiFi Exposure

According to Cointelegraph, a crypto user known as The Smart Ape reported losing approximately $5,000 from a hot wallet during a hotel stay. The loss was not due to clicking a phishing link but resulted from a series of errors, including using an open WiFi network, taking a phone call in the lobby, and approving a seemingly routine wallet request. Security firm Hacken analyzed the incident, revealing how attackers can exploit network-level vulnerabilities and social cues to drain funds days after a victim signs a seemingly harmless message. The attack began when the victim connected his laptop to the hotel's open WiFi, a captive portal without a password, and engaged in routine activities like scanning Discord and X, and checking balances. Unbeknownst to him, open networks allow all guests to share the same local environment. Dmytro Yasmanovych, cybersecurity compliance lead at Hacken, explained that attackers can use techniques like Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing, Domain Name System (DNS) manipulation, or rogue access points to inject malicious JavaScript into otherwise legitimate websites. Even if the DeFi front end is trusted, the execution context may be compromised. The attacker identified the user as involved in crypto after overhearing a phone conversation in the hotel lobby. This information helped narrow the target and hinted at the likely wallet stack, specifically Phantom on Solana, which was not compromised as a wallet provider. Physical exposure of crypto profiles poses a long-standing risk, as Bitcoin engineer and security expert Jameson Lopp has emphasized that openly discussing crypto or flaunting wealth is highly risky. Yasmanovych warned that cyber attacks often begin with observation, and public conversations about crypto holdings can serve as reconnaissance, aiding attackers in selecting the right tools, wallets, and timing. The critical moment occurred when the user signed what appeared to be a normal transaction. While swapping on a legitimate decentralized finance (DeFi) front end, injected code replaced or piggy-backed a wallet request, asking for permission rather than a token transfer. Yasmanovych noted this pattern fits a broader class of attacks known as approval abuse, where attackers obtain standing permissions and wait before executing the actual transfer. By the time the victim realized, the wallet had been emptied of Solana (SOL) and other tokens. The attacker waited until the victim left the hotel to transfer SOL, move tokens, and send NFTs to another address. The victim's wallet was a secondary hot wallet, limiting the damage, but the incident highlights how little is required to swipe users' funds: one untrusted network, one moment of inattention, and one signed approval. Yasmanovych recommended treating all public networks as hostile when traveling, avoiding open WiFi for wallet interactions, using a mobile hotspot or reputable VPN, and transacting only from hardened, up-to-date devices with minimal browser attack surface. Users should segment funds across wallets, treat every on-chain approval as a high-risk event to be regularly reviewed and revoked, and maintain strong physical operational security by never discussing holdings or wallet details in public.