Ant Group Secretly Files “Antcoin” Despite Beijing Clamps Down On Stablecoins

Ant Group is quietly tested the limits of Beijing’s crypto red lines by secretly filing to trademark digital currency dubbed “Antcoin” in Hong Kong through a Cayman Islands subsidiary.

This move came less than a week after the Chinese government intercepted both Ant Group's and JD.com's effort to release their own stablecoin in Hong Kong, making it seem like a deliberate effort from the Chinese tech giant to test the waters and test methods to bypass the sanctions from Beijing.

The trademark filing, dated June 18 and revealed by the Hong Kong Economic Times, lists digital currency and blockchain services among its covered categories. Domain-dispute documents also showed that the company who filed the license was a subsidiary company of the Chinese tech giant in the Cayman Islands.

Ant Group’s offshore trademark strategy is textbook corporate brinkmanship. By routing the Antcoin application through a Cayman entity and filing in Hong Kong — a jurisdiction that has explicitly tried to position itself as a regulated Web3 hub — Ant can simultaneously lobby for future optionality and limit immediate legal exposure on the mainland.

This is not a clerical error or a PR stunt. Ant’s lawyers and governance teams know full well that Beijing has been explicit: private issuance of currency-like tokens crosses a red line. Yet Ant’s trademark move suggests the company is prepared to test the gray zone between Hong Kong’s crypto framework and mainland prohibitions.

Hong Kong: Sandbox Or Pressure Point?

Hong Kong’s push earlier this year to accept stablecoin issuer applications promised a regulated channel for token experiments. For a moment, analysts argued Hong Kong could serve as a controlled lab for renminbi-linked tokens that might internationalize the yuan under Beijing’s supervision.

But the honeymoon was short. Warnings from mainland regulators and SFC officials about fraud and market manipulation made the corridor narrower than many expected.

Ant’s filing exploits that narrow corridor. In practice, the company could be positioning Antcoin as a corporate instrument that operates under Hong Kong rules and offshore incorporation — a model that would let Ant capture tokenization upside without direct onshore issuance. That is, until Beijing steps in.

Why Ant Would Risk A Direct Test Of Beijing’s Patience

Ant Group’s decision to quietly move forward with the Antcoin filing likely reflects a calculated blend of pragmatism and defiance. After years of enduring Beijing’s sweeping regulatory crackdowns—which dismantled parts of its fintech empire and curtailed its IPO dreams—Ant seems intent on reclaiming some measure of autonomy.

Filing through a Cayman Islands subsidiary in Hong Kong allows the firm to operate at the edge of China’s jurisdiction while still maintaining plausible deniability. It’s a strategic maneuver that tests the boundaries of Beijing’s tolerance without directly crossing the red line.

At its core, Ant’s move appears to be about preserving optionality. Even if Antcoin never launches publicly, securing the trademark gives the company a future foothold in blockchain finance—a sector too significant to ignore as tokenization and digital asset integration accelerate globally. Should Chinese policy later shift toward a more open stance on digital assets, Ant will already have the infrastructure and intellectual property in place to move quickly.

There’s also a broader geopolitical dimension. A Hong Kong–based token, potentially structured around the renminbi or Ant’s payments network, could become a bridge for cross-border trade and settlement—quietly reinforcing China’s influence in international finance.

From that perspective, Ant’s actions might even align with Beijing’s long-term ambition to expand the global reach of the yuan, though through a channel that remains under corporate, not state, control.

At the same time, Ant is signaling to global investors and competitors that it hasn’t lost its innovative edge. Despite Beijing’s tightening control over monetary issuance, the company’s willingness to operate in regulatory gray zones demonstrates both resilience and ambition.

Antcoin, therefore, is more than just a trademark filing—it’s a statement of intent. It suggests that while China may tighten the leash on fintech, innovation within its borders is not easily extinguished.

But the risks are existential. China’s leadership has been clear that currency issuance is a sovereign prerogative. Beijing’s PBoC and CAC actions to halt Ant’s and JD.com’s stablecoin plans were a direct assertion of that principle. The authority’s concern is straightforward: private stablecoins can create parallel monetary networks that complicate capital controls, payment monitoring, and the centralized data flows Beijing values.

Beijing has already broadened the crackdown: it ordered brokerages to pause real-world asset (RWA) tokenization in Hong Kong and cautioned businesses about publishing stablecoin research. Those interventions make Ant’s filing a gamble. If regulators interpret the stamp as a defiant step rather than a preparatory filing, Ant risks stronger enforcement, reputational damage, and possibly new restrictions on its mainland operations.

Is Ant Testing Beijing — Or Hedging Bets?

So which is it: is this an act of defiance or hedging?

A defensible reading is that Ant is cautiously hedging. Trademarks are low-cost, reversible actions that keep a project on the books without launching it. Legal teams often file intellectual property and regulatory applications to preserve future options. From that vantage, Antcoin is a sleeping asset — a placeholder for a post-policy environment.

But the optics of filing via a Cayman entity during an overt crackdown are aggressive. It signals willingness to probe the state’s patience and to rely on offshore protections should tensions rise. If Ant’s intention were purely conservative, it could have paused filings entirely. That it did not suggests the company is using corporate law and cross-border jurisdictional gaps to quietly push the frontier.

Ant’s maneuver — and Beijing’s swift clampdown — underscore a bifurcated future for China’s digital finance. On the one hand, the e-CNY remains untouchable: the central bank will expand pilots and cross-border use cases on its timetable.

On the other, private firms with global footprints will continue to explore tokenization in jurisdictions less tightly controlled by Beijing. Hong Kong becomes the legal and political stage where that contest plays out.

For the global crypto industry, Antcoin’s filing is a reminder that major incumbents will test regulatory limits when commercial incentives are large. For policymakers, it highlights the speed at which corporate ingenuity can exploit jurisdictional seams — and why states that value monetary sovereignty respond vigorously.

Ant Group’s Antcoin filing is calculated and audacious. It is a pragmatic attempt to keep innovation alive, preserve future maneuvers, and stake a claim in tokenized finance. But it is also a risky posture that flirts with political rebuke. Beijing has already flagged the stakes: money equals power, and the Communist Party will not cede that.

If Ant is looking to redraw the line, it should know the house still holds the cards. Antcoin may live in the gray for now, but the island of permissiveness in Hong Kong is shrinking. Sooner or later Ant must either shelve the project in deference to Beijing, repatriate it under tighter state supervision, or attempt a cross-border rollout that invites a major regulatory response.

Either way, this episode shows that in China, corporate ambition and political sovereignty remain a zero-sum game. Ant’s filing is a bold tactical play — a test of how far a tech champion can leverage offshore structures to escape domestic constraints.

It will be a key moment: if Ant prevails, it may open new models for regulated, corporate-linked tokenization in Asia. If it fails, it will be a cautionary tale about the limits of corporate defiance in the era of digital authoritarianism.