EU Imposes Sanctions Over Digital Asset-Driven Pro-Russian Disinformation Campaigns

The European Union has sanctioned a network of individuals and entities accused of leveraging digital assets to circumvent sanctions and finance pro-Russian disinformation efforts throughout Europe.

On Tuesday, under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, sanctions were levied against nine individuals and six organizations identified as instrumental in influence operations supporting Russian interests.

Among those sanctioned is Kremlin-linked influencer Simeon Boikov—widely known as “AussieCossack”—for his role in amplifying pro-Russian narratives and disseminating fabricated content, including a false video about voter fraud in Georgia during the 2024 US election.

Crypto Fundraising and Evasion Tactics

A TRM Labs report reveals Boikov’s fundraising strategy relied on cash and cryptocurrency donations. The investigation links him to high-risk Russian crypto exchanges that operate without know-your-client (KYC) protocols, as well as to cash-to-crypto services and darknet market channels.

These tactics enabled the rapid accumulation and movement of funds with limited regulatory oversight.

The EU’s sanctions extend to A7 OOO, a company reportedly engaged in attempts to sway Moldova’s 2024 presidential election and EU accession referendum through vote buying.

A7 OOO, founded by sanctioned Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, has been implicated in facilitating the movement of $1 billion out of three of the nation's banks.

A7 OOO is closely linked to A7A5, a ruble-backed stablecoin that has become a primary settlement tool on Grinex—a crypto exchange seen as the successor to Russia’s previously sanctioned Garantex platform.

This pattern mirrors recent UK sanctions against A7 OOO for suspected election manipulation in Moldova.

The Geopolitical Role of Crypto Assets

TRM Labs explains that A7 was initially conceived to enable cross-border commerce in the wake of Russia’s Ukraine invasion.

However, the company’s digital asset infrastructure—specifically Grinex and A7A5—now appears closely tied to the import of dual-use goods from China into Russia via Central Asia.

Dual-use items include technologies and materials suitable for both civilian and military deployment, often subject to export restrictions due to their potential impact on weapons development or surveillance.

By targeting both the individuals orchestrating these schemes and the digital infrastructure underpinning them, the EU demonstrates a strategic evolution in its approach to sanction enforcement.

The latest measures aim to disrupt the entire lifecycle of influence operations, from the flow of illicit funds through crypto networks to the dissemination of disinformation.

This approach underscores the EU’s commitment to curbing the misuse of digital assets for geopolitical manipulation and highlights the growing scrutiny of crypto’s role in international security and policymaking.