Across pioneered the privatization of its DAO, causing its token to surge by 75%. What is the market cheering about?

Source: Galaxy; Compiled by: Jinse Finance

Across Protocol, a cross-chain bridging protocol that has been quietly working in the cryptocurrency field and handling intent processing, proposed a groundbreaking move in the cryptocurrency industry on March 11: privatizing DAOs.

Across Protocol, backed by venture capital firm Paradigm and proven in real-world applications, will offer ACX token holders two options.

The first is equity exchange: holders can exchange ACX for shares in the newly established corporate entity, AcrossCo. Holders with larger holdings can exchange directly, while holders with smaller holdings will need to exchange through a fee-free special purpose vehicle (SPV). The second option is a token buyback: holders can exchange ACX for USDC at $0.04375, representing a 25% premium over the average spot price over the month prior to March 11th, with a six-month consideration period. This buyback will be financed using Across's liquid assets, roughly equivalent to its current market capitalization. In other words: cash or stock. The choice is yours. Across co-founder Hart Lambur stated that the motivation is pragmatic. The DAO structure has become an obstacle as Across seeks to partner with more traditional financial institutions. Selling infrastructure to traditional financial (TradFi) institutions, and even to cryptocurrency-related companies that hire lawyers, increasingly requires "out-of-contract agreements." Designating counterparties, signing off, assigning responsibility—these are things DAOs, in their purest form, are not good at. Lamble argues that the future requires structured business relationships and legal recourse mechanisms. You can't just send a snapshot link to a Delaware court. Across hopes to reposition itself to fit this future. The proposal raises a series of unsettling yet thought-provoking questions about DAO governance, token holder rights, and the organizational form of crypto protocols. What will happen to holders who don't make a choice by the deadline? Will they be liquidated like many token holders taxed for inactivity? Governance participation is uneven. Many holders are traders, not governance participants. Others hold DAOs long-term but are indifferent. Still others are ideologically focused on "token price maximization" rather than governance processes; this camp exhibits a "futarchy" tendency, accustomed to assessing value based on the immediate market impact of every action. The paradox lies here. A venture-backed protocol, if its aim is to build a financial transformation infrastructure that lasts for decades, may require a long-term perspective. However, highly liquid tokens can be traded every second, and their holders have varying investment horizons. If effective investment depresses token prices in the short term, the market will punish long-term decisions that create lasting value. This isn't a problem unique to cryptocurrencies. The public stock market has debated short-termism for decades. The current US government has even proposed reducing the frequency of financial reporting to address the short-sightedness of quarterly earnings. Amazon in 1997 wasn't aiming for next quarter's earnings per share, but rather for market dominance a decade later. Our View: Across seems to answer the question "Can DAOs aim for dominance?" with a "no." But this isn't a moral battle between DAOs and corporations; it's more about legal compatibility. As cryptocurrencies continue to evolve and integrate with traditional finance, protocols need counterparties, responsible parties, and accredited representatives to interact with traditional legal structures and contracts. As we discussed before, some DAO structures are difficult to "convert" into equity-like arrangements without friction. There are some workarounds: tokenizing true equity while adding legal wrapping (Gabe Shapiro's MetaLeX theory). Theoretically, Across could retain the tokens and restructure their rights. However, it offers a scheme closer to classic merger-and-private deals (similar to leveraged buyouts in Wall Street's "two-shirt era"). We've seen DAO mergers (Fei-Rari), token-granted equity (Backpack), LayerZero closing and absorbing DAOs, and "ownership tokens" with redemption mechanisms. But this time, a tender offer funded by protocol assets with an option to exchange equity appears to be the first DAO privatization deal in the cryptocurrency space. The market reacted enthusiastically, with the ACX token price surging over 75%, far exceeding the previously expected 25% premium (above the 30-day average). But what exactly is the market cheering about? One explanation is that the DAO architecture is severely misaligned with the protocol's growth prospects, leading to a halving of the company's value. Removing governance barriers, increasing company transparency, simplifying decision-making processes, and unlocking value. Another possible explanation is that the real advantage lies in the partnerships that are now possible: traditional financial integration, fee-sharing arrangements, and corporate contracts that governance forums cannot sign. The premium may reflect the expansion of opportunities under the new legal framework, or it may reflect market skepticism about the DAO's ability to compete effectively in a rapidly changing market. In any case, the market is confirming that the DAO architecture is not suitable for Across's business prospects. Perhaps the reason is simpler. The market loves options. ACX holders receive a guarantee (a premium USDC) and a 6-month call option (equity in a potentially more flexible and collaborative company). Traders often click "buy" when they have both downside protection and upside potential. But the deeper lesson lies at the structural level. Liquidity tokens impose public market constraints on tech companies that are essentially still in the venture capital stage. DAOs promise decentralization, but their anarchy also leads to fragmented accountability and a lack of focus. As Gabriel Shapiro points out, DAOs are well-suited for managing the variable parts of smart contract code, but struggle to adapt to rapidly changing competitive landscapes. DAO governance is inconsistent and lacks focus; when token price becomes the measure of success, long-term strategies may be neglected, and short-term price management becomes the primary objective. Across is attempting a different balance: retaining the protocol and mission, but changing the coordination mechanism. If this attempt succeeds, if partnerships accelerate, if equity holders reap greater rewards than acquirers, and if the protocol flourishes, then more DAOs are expected to discover that decentralization is a continuous process, not a static rule. The decentralization of decision-making power inevitably involves a trade-off with execution efficiency. For a century, companies have been refining this balance through principal-agent frameworks in organizational behavior research. The cypherpunk dream is unstoppable code. Business reality is signatories and indemnity agreements. Perhaps the optimal balance lies somewhere in between.