How should we correctly view the convenience, risks, and regulatory challenges brought by crypto assets?

As the investigation into the Prince Group case deepens, its impact continues to expand. After the global law enforcement storm triggered by the Chen Zhi case subsided, a deeper question emerged: Have cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin quietly slid from a "decentralized financial revolution" into "the infrastructure of a criminal economy"?

Today, the Sa Jie team will discuss this case again with our readers, analyzing the inextricable relationship between cryptocurrencies and illegal activities, as well as the future regulatory and development trends of cryptocurrencies.

With the US Department of Justice filing criminal charges against Chen Zhi, chairman of the Prince Group, and multiple countries simultaneously freezing his related assets, this "crypto black market crackdown" spanning Southeast Asia and the West seems to have come to an end.

Behind the noise, however, an undeniable reality is emerging: cryptocurrencies are becoming a core tool for new types of transnational crime, deeply embedded in the black market chains from telecommunications fraud and human trafficking to money laundering. This not only threatens public safety but may also fundamentally shake the legitimacy of the cryptocurrency community. II. Is there a "double-cross" between the US government and Prince Group? The criminal nature of Prince Group is undeniable; its actions far exceed ordinary financial crimes, forming a complex criminal network of "human trafficking-forced labor-crypto fraud-cross-border money laundering," which should be severely punished. However, if the US actually uses hacking to steal Bitcoin beforehand to confiscate the proceeds of Prince Group's crimes, that would be a different matter entirely. In this action by the United States, on the one hand, there are questions about the application and legitimacy of its "long-arm jurisdiction" principle in the field of digital assets. The US Department of Justice asserts jurisdiction based on the "minimum connection principle," meaning that jurisdiction can be exercised as long as the criminal act has a weak connection with the United States—such as the use of US technological infrastructure or involvement in the US financial system. This move further expands the scope of jurisdiction in the cryptocurrency field, substantially eroding the principles of international law based on territorial and personal jurisdiction, and infringing upon the judicial sovereignty of countries where the acts occurred, such as Cambodia. It has been criticized as a form of legal expansionism relying on technological and financial hegemony. On the other hand, the United States employs civil forfeiture procedures, directly suing against the Bitcoin assets themselves, bypassing judicial control over the suspects. Furthermore, this system reverses the burden of proof, requiring asset holders to prove their innocence, and trials are often conducted in the defendant's absence, restricting their right to defense. The legal boundaries of new methods such as on-chain evidence collection also lack clear judicial review. This "forfeiture first, proof later" approach may constitute "prejudgment," insufficiently protecting individual procedural rights while pursuing enforcement effectiveness. In conclusion, while the Chen Zhi case will eventually come to an end, if the cryptocurrency industry cannot effectively sever its ties with the illicit sector, what awaits it may not be the rise of "digital gold," but rather the stigma of being a "high-risk asset." The future of the cryptocurrency world will no longer belong to the most anonymous individuals, but to the most compliant, transparent, and responsible builders. After all, in a society governed by the rule of law, there is no freedom to shirk responsibility, nor is there security to ignore risks.