Source: Crypto Pump & Dumps Have Become the Ugly Norm. Can They Be Stopped; Translated by: lenaxin, ChainCatcher
This article is compiled from an interview with the Unchained blog. The guests are José Macedo, founder of Delphi Labs, Omar Shakeeb, co-founder of SecondLane, and Taran Sabharwal, CEO of STIX. They talked about liquidity shortages, market manipulation, inflated valuations, opaque lock-up mechanisms, and how the industry can conduct self-regulation in the crypto market.
The core function of market makers is to provide liquidity for tokens and reduce transaction slippage.
The option incentives in the crypto market may induce "pump and dump" behavior.
It is recommended to adopt a fixed fee model to reduce manipulation risks.
The crypto market can refer to the regulatory rules of traditional finance, but it needs to adapt to the decentralized characteristics.
Exchange supervision and industry self-discipline are key entry points to promote transparency.
Project parties manipulate the market by falsely reporting circulation and transferring selling pressure through over-the-counter transactions.
Reduce project financing valuations to prevent retail investors from taking over high-bubble assets.
The lock-up mechanism is not transparent, and early investors are forced to cash out informally, causing a stampede: dYdX plummeted.
VC and founders have misaligned interests, and token unlocking is out of touch with ecological development.
Disclose the real circulation volume, lock-up terms and market maker dynamics on the chain.
Allow reasonable liquidity release and layered capital collaboration.
Verify product demand before financing to avoid VC hot spot misleading.
Laura Shin: Let's first explore the role of market makers in the crypto market. What core problems do they solve for project parties and the market? At the same time, what potential manipulation risks does the current market mechanism have?
José Macedo: The core function of market makers is to provide liquidity in multiple trading venues to ensure that the market has sufficient buying and selling depth. Its profit model mainly relies on the bid-ask spread.
Unlike traditional financial markets, in the cryptocurrency market, market makers often obtain a large number of tokens through option agreements, thereby occupying a large proportion of the circulation, which gives them the potential ability to manipulate prices.
Such option agreements usually contain the following elements:
The exercise price is usually based on the previous round of financing price or the 7-day weighted average price (TWAP) after issuance, with a premium of 25%-50%.
When the market price reaches the exercise price, the market maker has the right to exercise the option and make a profit.
This protocol structure will incentivize market makers to artificially push up prices to a certain extent. Although mainstream market makers are generally more cautious, non-standard option agreements do have potential risks.
We recommend that projects adopt a "fixed fee" model, that is, pay a fixed monthly fee to hire market makers and require them to maintain a reasonable bid-ask spread and continuous market depth, rather than driving prices through complex incentive structures.
In short, fees should be unrelated to token price performance; cooperation should be service-oriented; and avoid distorting goals due to incentive mechanisms.
Taran Sabharwal: The core value of market makers is to reduce transaction slippage. For example, I once made a seven-figure transaction on Solana, which generated 22% on-chain slippage, and professional market makers can significantly optimize this indicator. Given that their services save costs for all traders, market makers should be compensated accordingly.
Projects need to clarify incentive goals when selecting market makers. In the basic service model, market makers mainly provide liquidity and lending services; in the short-term consulting model, short-term incentives are set around key nodes such as the mainnet launch, such as stabilizing prices through the TWAP trigger mechanism.
However, if the strike price is set too high, once the price exceeds expectations, market makers may execute option arbitrage and sell tokens on a large scale, thereby exacerbating market volatility.
Lessons learned show that it is necessary to avoid setting too high strike prices and give priority to the basic service model to control the uncertainty brought by complex protocols.
Omar Shakeeb: There are two core problems with the current market making mechanism.
First, there is a misalignment in the incentive mechanism. Market makers often pay more attention to arbitrage opportunities brought by price increases rather than fulfilling their basic responsibility of providing liquidity. They should attract retail transactions by continuously providing liquidity, rather than simply betting on price fluctuations to obtain arbitrage returns.
Secondly, there is a serious lack of transparency. Project parties usually hire multiple market makers at the same time, but these institutions operate independently and lack a coordination mechanism. At present, only project foundations and exchanges have a specific list of market makers, while secondary market participants have no access to relevant information about the transaction executors. This opacity makes it difficult to hold the relevant responsible parties accountable when abnormal situations occur in the market.
Laura Shin: Has your company ever participated in Movement-related business?
Omar Shakeeb: Our company has indeed participated in Movement-related business, but only in the private placement market. Our business processes are extremely rigorous and we maintain close communication with the project founders, including Taran. We have conducted rigorous investigations and audits on the backgrounds of every investor, consultant, and other participants.
However, we are not aware of the pricing and specific operations involved in the market making process. The relevant documents are only held internally by the project foundation and the market maker and are not disclosed to other parties.
Laura Shin: So, did your company serve as a market maker during the project's token generation event (TGE)? However, I guess the agreement between your company and the foundation should be very different from the agreement of the market maker?
Omar Shakeeb: No, we are not involved in the market making business. We are engaged in the private market business, which is a completely different field from the market making business. The private market is essentially an over-the-counter (OTC) transaction, which usually occurs before and after the TGE.
José Macedo: Did Rushi sell tokens through OTC transactions?
Omar Shakeeb: As far as I know, Rushi has not sold tokens through over-the-counter transactions. The foundation has made it clear that there will be no sales, but how to verify this commitment remains a difficult problem. The same risk exists for market maker transactions. Even if the market maker completes a large transaction, it may only sell tokens on behalf of the project team, and the outside world cannot know the specific details. This is exactly the problem caused by lack of transparency.
I suggest that wallets be clearly marked from the early stages of token distribution, such as "Foundation Wallet", "CEO Wallet", "Co-founder Wallet", etc. In this way, the source of each transaction can be traced, so as to clarify the actual sales of each party.
José Macedo: We did consider marking wallets, but this measure may cause privacy leaks and raise the threshold for entrepreneurship.
José Macedo: As Hester Pierce emphasized in the recent safe harbor rule proposal, the project party should disclose its market-making arrangements.
Currently, exchanges tend to maintain low circulation to achieve high valuations, while market makers rely on information asymmetry to obtain high fees.
We can learn from the regulatory experience of traditional finance (TradFi). The Securities Exchange Act of the 1930s and the market manipulation methods in the 1970s and 1980s revealed by Edwin Lefebvre in Reminiscences of a Stock Operator, such as inducing retail investors to take over by inflating trading volume, are exactly the same as some phenomena in the current cryptocurrency market.
Therefore, we recommend that these mature regulatory systems be introduced into the cryptocurrency field to effectively curb price manipulation. Specific measures include:
Prohibit market price manipulation by means of false orders, front-running and priority execution.
Ensure transparency and fairness in price discovery mechanisms and prevent any behavior that may distort price signals.
Laura Shin: There are many challenges to achieving transparency between issuers and market makers. As Evgeny Gavoy pointed out on The Chop Block, market making mechanisms in Asian markets generally lack transparency, and achieving global unified regulation is almost impossible.
So, how should these obstacles be overcome? Can industry self-discipline drive change? Is it possible to form a hybrid model of "global convention + regional implementation" in the short term?
Omar Shakeeb: The biggest problem is that the underlying operation of the market is extremely opaque. If the top market makers can spontaneously establish an open source information disclosure mechanism, this will significantly improve the current situation of the market.
Laura Shin: But will this practice lead to the phenomenon of "bad money driving out good money"? Violators may avoid compliance agencies, so how to truly curb such bad behavior?
José Macedo: At the regulatory level, the exchange review mechanism can be used to promote transparency. Specific measures include: requiring exchanges to publish a list of market makers and establishing a "compliant whitelist" system.
In addition, industry self-discipline is equally important. For example, the audit mechanism is a typical case. Although there is no legal requirement, it is almost impossible for projects that have not been audited to obtain investment today. Similarly, similar standards can be established for the qualification review of market makers. If a project is found to use non-compliant market makers, its reputation will be damaged. Just as there are good and bad auditing agencies, a reputation system for market makers also needs to be established.
Regulation is feasible, and centralized exchanges are the key entry point. These exchanges generally want to serve American users, and U.S. law has a wide range of jurisdiction over crypto businesses. Therefore, whether users are in the United States or not, as long as they use U.S. exchanges, they must comply with relevant regulations.
In summary, exchange supervision and industry self-discipline can both be important means to effectively regulate market behavior.
Laura Shin: You mentioned that market maker information should be made public and that compliant market makers should be recognized by the market. However, if someone deliberately chooses non-compliant market makers, and such institutions themselves lack the motivation to publicly disclose their partnerships, then the following situation may occur: the project party uses compliant market makers on the surface to maintain its reputation, but actually entrusts opaque institutions to operate at the same time. The key question is:
How to ensure that the project party fully discloses all the market makers they cooperate with?
For market makers who do not actively disclose information, how can the outside world discover their illegal operations?
José Macedo: If it is found that the exchange violates the rules and uses non-whitelist institutions, it is equivalent to fraud. Although the project party can theoretically cooperate with multiple market makers, in practice, due to the limited circulation of most projects, there are usually only 1-2 core market makers, so it is difficult to conceal the real cooperation object.
Taran Sabharwal: This issue should be analyzed from the perspective of market makers. First of all, it is one-sided to simply divide market makers into "compliant" and "non-compliant". How to require non-regulated exchanges to ensure the compliance of their trading entities? The top three exchanges (Binance, OKEx, Bybit) are all offshore and unregulated institutions, while Upbit focuses on spot trading in the Korean market.
Regulation faces many challenges, including regional differences, head monopoly, and high entry barriers. In terms of division of responsibilities, project founders should bear the main responsibility for their manipulation. Although the review mechanism of the exchange is already quite strict, it is still difficult to eliminate circumvention operations.
Take Movement as an example. Its problems are essentially social mistakes, such as over-commitment and improper transfer of control, rather than technical defects. Although its token market value has fallen from 14 billion FTB to 2 billion, many new projects have followed suit. However, the team's structural errors, especially the improper transfer of control, ultimately led to the project's return to zero.
Laura Shin: How should all parties work together to solve the many problems currently exposed?
José Macedo: Disclosing the true circulation volume is the key. Many projects inflate their valuations by falsely reporting the amount of tokens in circulation, but in reality a large number of tokens are still locked up. However, tokens held by foundations and labs are usually not subject to lock-up periods, which means they can be sold through market makers on the first day of the token launch.
This operation is essentially a "soft exit" method: the team cashes out when the market is hot on the first day of the launch, and then uses the funds to repurchase the unlocked team tokens a year later, or to increase the TVL of the protocol in the short term before withdrawing.
In terms of the token distribution mechanism, a cost-based unlocking mechanism should be introduced, such as the practices of platforms such as Legion or Echo. At present, channels such as Binance Launchpool have obvious flaws, and it is difficult to distinguish between real user funds and platform self-held funds in the multi-billion dollar fund pool. Therefore, it is urgent to establish a more transparent public sale mechanism.
It is also crucial to ensure that the market making process is transparent and that retail investors can clearly understand the actual holdings of tokens. Although most projects have made some progress in terms of transparency, further improvement is still needed. To this end, it is necessary to require the disclosure of the details of the token lending agreement of the market maker, including key information such as the lending quantity, option agreement and its exercise price, so as to provide retail investors with more comprehensive market insights and help them make more informed investment decisions.
In general, the disclosure of the real circulation, the standard disclosure of market making agreements and the improvement of the token distribution mechanism are the most urgent reform directions at present.
Omar Shakeeb: The first issue is to adjust the financing valuation system. The current project valuation is inflated, generally 3-5 billion US dollars, which is beyond the affordability of retail investors. Taking Movement as an example, its token valuation fell from 14 billion to 2 billion. This overly high initial valuation is not beneficial to any party. It should return to the early valuation level of Solana (300-400 million US dollars), allowing more users to participate at a reasonable price, which is also more conducive to the healthy development of the ecosystem.
Regarding the use of the ecosystem fund, we have observed that the project party often falls into operational difficulties. Should it be handed over to the market maker? Conduct over-the-counter transactions? Or other ways? We always recommend choosing over-the-counter (OTC), which can ensure that the recipient of funds is consistent with the strategic goals of the project. Celestia is a typical case. After the token issuance, they raised more than 100 million US dollars at a valuation of 3 billion, but achieved effective allocation of funds through reasonable planning.
Laura Shin: Is the essence of current market regulation measures to gradually guide artificially manipulated token activities, such as market maker intervention, to a development track that conforms to the laws of the natural market? Can this transformation achieve a win-win situation for all parties, protecting the interests of early investors and ensuring the sustainable development of the project team?
José Macedo: The structural contradiction facing the current market lies in the imbalance of the valuation system. In the last bull market, the market showed a general rise due to the scarcity of projects; in this cycle, due to the overinvestment of venture capital (VC), there is a serious oversupply of infrastructure tokens, which has caused most funds to fall into a loss cycle and have to raise new funds by selling their holdings.
This imbalance between supply and demand has directly changed the market behavior pattern. Buyer funds are fragmented, and the holding period has been shortened from years to months or even weeks. The OTC market has fully turned to hedging strategies, and investors have maintained market neutrality through options tools, completely saying goodbye to the naked long strategy in the last cycle. Project parties must face up to this change: the success of Solana and AVAX is based on the industry gap, and new projects need to adopt a small circulation strategy (for example, Ondo controls the actual circulation below 2%) and maintain price stability by signing OTC agreements with large holders such as Columbia University.
Projects such as Sui and Mantra, which performed well in this round, have verified the effectiveness of this path, while Movement's attempt to stimulate prices through token economics design without a mainnet has proven to be a major strategic mistake.
Laura Shin: If Columbia University did not create a wallet, how did they receive these tokens? This seems a bit unreasonable.
Taran Sabharwal: As one of the main institutional holders of Ondo, Columbia University's tokens are in a non-circulating state because they have not created a wallet, which objectively forms the phenomenon of "paper circulation". The token economic structure of this project presents a significant feature: since the large-scale unlocking in January this year, no new tokens will be released until January 2025. Market data shows that although perpetual contracts are active, the depth of the spot order book is seriously insufficient. This artificial shortage of liquidity makes the price vulnerable to small funds.
In contrast, Mantra has adopted a more aggressive liquidity manipulation strategy. The project transferred the selling pressure to forward buyers through over-the-counter transactions, and used the proceeds to pull the spot market. With only $20-40 million in funds, a 100-fold price increase was created on a deep and weak order book, causing the market value to soar from $100 million to $12 billion. This "time arbitrage" mechanism is essentially a short squeeze using liquidity manipulation rather than a price discovery process based on real demand.
Omar Shakeeb: The key to the problem is that the project has set up a multiple lock-up mechanism, but these lock-up terms have never been disclosed publicly, which is the most difficult part of the whole incident.
José Macedo: The circulation of tokens shown by authoritative data sources such as Coingecko is seriously distorted. Project parties often count "inactive tokens" controlled by the foundation and the team into the circulation, resulting in a surface circulation rate of more than 50%, while the actual circulation entering the market may be less than 5%, of which 4% is still controlled by market makers.
This systematic data manipulation is suspected of fraud. When investors trade based on the wrong perception of 60% of the circulation, in fact, 55% of the tokens are frozen in cold wallets by the project party. This serious information gap directly distorts the price discovery mechanism, making the real circulation of only 5% a tool for market manipulation.
Laura Shin: JP (Jump Trading) market operation techniques have been widely studied. Do you think this is an innovative model worthy of reference, or does it reflect the short-term arbitrage mentality of market participants? How should the nature of such strategies be characterized?
Taran Sabharwal: JP's operation demonstrates a sophisticated ability to control market supply and demand, but its essence is a short-term value illusion achieved by artificially creating a liquidity shortage. This strategy is not replicable and will undermine the healthy development of the market in the long run. The current market imitation phenomenon just exposes the mentality of participants who are eager for quick success and instant benefits, that is, they are overly concerned about market value manipulation and ignore the real value creation.
José Macedo: It is necessary to clearly distinguish between "innovation" and "manipulation". In the traditional financial market, similar operations will be characterized as market manipulation. The crypto market seems "legal" due to the lack of supervision, but this is essentially a wealth transfer through information asymmetry, rather than sustainable market innovation.
Taran Sabharwal: The core problem lies in the behavior pattern of market participants. In the current crypto market, the vast majority of retail investors lack basic due diligence awareness, and their investment behavior is essentially closer to gambling than rational investment. This irrational mentality of pursuing short-term profits objectively creates an ideal operating environment for market manipulators.
Omar Shakeeb: The key to the problem is that the project party has set up a multiple lock-up mechanism, but these lock-up terms have never been disclosed publicly, which is the most difficult part of the whole incident.
Taran Sabharwal: The truth of market manipulation is often hidden in the order book. When a $1 million buy order can drive a 5% price fluctuation, it means that the market depth does not exist at all. Many project parties use technical unlocking loopholes (tokens are unlocked but actually locked for a long time) to falsely report the circulation volume, causing short sellers to misjudge the risk. When Mantra first broke through the 1 billion market value, a large number of short sellers were liquidated and left the market.
WorldCoin is a typical case. At the beginning of last year, its fully diluted valuation was as high as 12 billion, but the actual circulation market value was only 500 million, creating a more extreme circulation shortage than ICP that year. Although this operation has allowed WorldCoin to maintain a valuation of 20 billion to date, it is essentially harvesting the market through information asymmetry.
However, JP needs to be evaluated objectively: during the market trough, he even sold his personal assets to repurchase tokens and maintained the project through equity financing. This persistence in the project really shows the responsibility of the founder.
Omar Shakeeb: Although JP is trying to turn the tide, it is not easy to make a comeback after being trapped in this situation. Once market trust collapses, it is difficult to rebuild.
Laura Shin: Do we have fundamental differences in the development concept of the crypto ecosystem? Are Bitcoin and Cex fundamentally different? Should the crypto industry give priority to encouraging token game design for short-term arbitrage, or return to value creation? When price and utility are out of touch, does the industry still have long-term value?
Taran Sabharwal: The problems in the crypto market are not isolated cases. Small-cap stocks in the traditional stock market also have liquidity manipulation. However, the current crypto market has evolved into a fierce game between institutions, with market makers hunting proprietary traders and quantitative funds harvesting hedge funds. Retail investors have long been marginalized.
This industry is gradually deviating from the original intention of encryption technology. When new institutions promote Dubai real estate to practitioners, the market has essentially become a naked game of wealth harvesting. A typical case is dBridge. Despite its leading cross-chain technology, the market value of its token is only 30 million US dollars; on the other hand, the meme coin, which has no technical content, easily breaks through the valuation of 10 billion with its marketing gimmick.
This distorted incentive mechanism is undermining the foundation of the industry. When traders can make a profit of 20 million US dollars by hyping "goat coins", who will concentrate on polishing products? The spirit of encryption is being eroded by the culture of short-term arbitrage, and the innovative motivation of builders is facing severe challenges.
José Macedo: There are two completely different narrative logics in the current encryption market. Viewing it as a "casino" of zero-sum game and viewing it as an engine of technological innovation will lead to completely opposite conclusions. Although the market is full of speculative behaviors such as VC short-term arbitrage and project market value management, there are also many builders who are quietly developing infrastructure such as identity protocols and decentralized exchanges.
Just like in the traditional venture capital field, 90% of startups fail but promote overall innovation. The core contradiction of the current token economy is that a bad launch mechanism may permanently damage the potential of the project. When engineers witness the token plummeting by 80%, who is willing to join? This highlights the importance of designing a sustainable token model: both resisting the temptation of short-term speculation and reserving resources for long-term development.
It is exciting that more and more founders are proving that encryption technology can transcend financial games.
Laura Shin: The real dilemma lies in how to define "soft landing".
Ideally, token unlocking should be deeply bound to the maturity of the ecosystem. Only when the community achieves self-organization and the project enters the stage of sustainable development, the profit-making behavior of the founding team is legitimate.
However, the reality is that, except for the time lock, almost all unlocking conditions can be manipulated, which is the core contradiction faced by the current token economic design.
Omar Shakeeb: The root cause of the current token economic design problem began with the first round of financing negotiations between VCs and founders, emphasizing that the token economy involves a balance of interests among multiple parties, which must not only meet the LP return demands, but also be responsible to retail investors. However, in reality, project parties often sign secret agreements with top funds (such as the high valuation terms of A16Z's investment in Aguilera, which were not disclosed until several months later), and retail investors cannot obtain OTC transaction details, making liquidity management a systemic problem.
Token issuance is not the end but the starting point of being responsible for the crypto ecosystem. Every failed token experiment consumes market trust capital. If the founder cannot ensure the long-term value of the token, the equity financing model should be adhered to.
José Macedo: The core contradiction is that VCs and founders have different interests. VCs pursue the maximization of portfolio returns, while founders are inevitably tempted to cash out when faced with huge wealth. Only when the on-chain verifiable mechanism (such as TVL fraud monitoring and liquidity verification) is improved can the market truly move towards standardization.
Laura Shin: So far, we have sorted out the room for improvement of each participant, including VCs, project parties, market makers, exchanges and retail investors themselves. How do you think it should be improved?
Omar Shakeeb: For founders, the first task is to verify the product-market fit, rather than blindly pursuing high financing. Practice shows that instead of raising 50 million yuan but failing to create market demand, it is better to use 2 million yuan to verify feasibility and then gradually expand.
This is also why we publish the private market liquidity report every month. Only when all the dark operations are put under the sun can the market achieve truly healthy development.
Taran Sabharwal: The current structural contradictions in the crypto market put founders in a dilemma. They must resist the temptation of short-term wealth and stick to value creation, while also dealing with the pressure of high development costs.
Some foundations have been transformed into private vaults of founders, and "zombie chains" with a market value of billions of dollars continue to consume ecological resources. While meme coins and AI concepts are being hyped up, infrastructure projects are deeply trapped in the dilemma of liquidity depletion, and some teams have even been forced to postpone the launch of token issuance for two years. This systemic distortion is seriously squeezing the living space of builders.
Omar Shakeeb: Take Eigen as an example. When its valuation reached US$6-7 billion, there were US$20-30 million in over-the-counter orders, but the foundation refused to release liquidity. This extremely conservative strategy actually missed a good opportunity. It could have asked the team if they needed $20 million to accelerate the roadmap, or allowed early investors to cash out 5-10% of their holdings to obtain a reasonable return.
The market is essentially a collaborative network for value distribution, not a zero-sum game. If the project party monopolizes the value chain, the ecosystem participants will eventually leave.
Taran Sabharwal: This exposes the most fundamental power game in the token economy. Founders always regard investors' early exit as betrayal, but ignore that liquidity itself is a key indicator of ecological health. When all participants are forced to lock positions, the seemingly stable market value actually hides systemic risks.
Omar Shakeeb: The current crypto market urgently needs to establish a positive cycle of value distribution mechanism: allowing early investors to exit at a reasonable time can not only attract high-quality long-term capital, but also form a synergy of capital with different maturities.
Short-term hedge funds provide liquidity, and long-term funds help development. This hierarchical collaboration mechanism can promote ecological prosperity far more than mandatory lock-up. The key lies in establishing a bond of trust. The reasonable returns of investors in round A will attract continuous injection of strategic capital in round B.
José Macedo: Founders need to recognize a cruel reality. Behind every successful project, there are a large number of failed cases. When the market is crazy about a concept, most teams will eventually exhaust two years and still be unable to issue tokens, forming a vicious cycle of concept arbitrage, which is essentially an overdraft of industry innovation.
The real way out is to return to the essence of the product and develop real needs with the minimum viable financing, rather than chasing hot signals in the capital market. In particular, we need to be vigilant against collective misjudgments caused by VC's wrong signals. When a concept obtains a large amount of financing, it often leads to founders misreading it as the real market demand.
As the gatekeeper of the industry, the exchange should strengthen the infrastructure function, establish a market maker agreement disclosure system, ensure that the circulation data can be verified on the chain, and standardize the over-the-counter transaction reporting process. Only by improving the market infrastructure can we help founders escape the prisoner's dilemma of "no hype or death" and push the industry back on the right track of value creation.
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