MEV is not destiny, but a choice that blockchain must face.

Author: Da Hongfei Source: cointelegraph Translation: Shan Ouba, Jinse Finance

MEV is not inevitable; it is a form of exploitation disguised as inevitability. The future of blockchain depends on eliminating this implicit tax on users.

Decentralization, permissionless, and transparency. These principles have drawn many of us into the blockchain ecosystem. However, this vision is still being eroded by a sinister and often invisible force: Maximum Extractable Value (MEV).

MEV is not inevitable; it is a choice.Too many people see it as an inevitable byproduct of blockchain, but this is not the case. MEV is deliberately designed into incentive mechanisms, and it can also be removed by design. If left unchecked, it will evolve into an implicit tax, a form of censorship, directly impacting fairness and decentralization.

Tolerating MEVs erodes user trust and hinders application adoption. Conversely, eliminating MEVs protects users and highlights the value of reliable, future-proof infrastructure. Building a fair system means creating a more competitive and investable ecosystem. Developers, builders, users, and investors need to recognize this threat and work together to eliminate it. This is both a moral responsibility and a strategic necessity for the future development of Web3. Obvious Censorship Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) refers to the maximum profit a block producer can obtain by manipulating transaction order. Some argue that MEVs exist in neutral forms, such as simple decentralized exchange arbitrage, but the vast majority of MEVs are harmful. These "harmful MEVs" constitute financial censorship and undermine security, permissionlessness, and decentralization. The most common examples include block withholding, time-stealing attacks, front-running, and sandwich attacks. Every action involves reordering transactions to extract value at the expense of users. These are not harmless industry tricks, but deliberate manipulations that violate user intent and erode trust. Allowing such behavior to exist is a policy choice, not a natural law. Hidden Taxes and Unintended Centralization Harmful MEVs are a symptom of centralized tendencies in a system that should be resisting centralization. No single entity should control the order of transactions, but MEVs concentrate power in the hands of a few exploiters, allowing them to profit. The result is an unfair competitive environment. When users fear front-running or sandwich attacks, they lose confidence in the integrity of the system. This trust deficit is fatal to long-term adoption. More seriously, MEVs distort the incentive mechanism: instead of rewarding those who strengthen the network's builders, they channel profits to those who exploit the network. This incentive misalignment poses an existential threat to the credibility of the blockchain. For investors, this is not merely a technical issue, but also a warning sign regarding governance. Blockchains that choose to tolerate MEVs expose their vulnerabilities, while those that choose to curb them demonstrate resilience. Solving the MEV problem is not just a moral stance, but also a competitive advantage. The sheer scale and deliberate concealment of MEVs make the label "hidden tax" very apt. While the costs of MEVs are hidden, they are real, with billions of dollars quietly draining from decentralized finance participants annually. On Ethereum alone, MEV withdrawals grew from $78 million in early 2021 to $600 million in 2023. In 2022, at least $133 million was extracted. These are conservative estimates. The actual scale is much larger due to opaque strategies such as multi-block MEVs, off-chain hedging, and long-tail attacks that are difficult to trace. This deliberate concealment exacerbates the severity of the problem. If MEVs become the norm, users may never know how much they have lost. Accepting this opacity is also an option. MEVs are neither necessary nor essential. Some argue that MEVs are a necessary evil, but this is by no means a justification for inaction. Supporters claim that MEVs can improve liquidity, but genuine arbitrage and market-making can thrive in transparent systems that do not rely on privileged transaction ordering. Experiments with cryptographic mempools and randomized ordering have demonstrated that efficiency and fairness can coexist. Others argue that MEVs incentivize block producers, but block builders already receive block rewards and transaction fees. MEVs are excessive and undeserved gains, acquired at the expense of user interests. Perhaps the most dangerous misconception is that "MEVs are inevitable." Solutions already exist: experiments with cryptographic transactions, fair ordering protocols, threshold encryption, and proposer-builder separation models demonstrate that harmful MEVs can be completely eliminated or at least minimized without impacting performance. Choosing not to implement these solutions is merely disguising complacency as realism. Moral Calls and Collective Action Beyond the technical aspects, this is a struggle concerning the core spirit of blockchain. If decentralization is to have any meaning, it must confront harmful MEVs head-on. Layer-1 builders must design protocols that are resistant to MEVs from the outset. Developers should avoid platforms that rely on exploitative mechanisms. Users must understand that fairness and ethics are not optional add-ons, but the cornerstones of decentralized networks. Investors must recognize that supporting blockchains that choose to address the MEV problem is both principled and prudent. A fairer blockchain is not only possible, but essential. It will reward those who build and support it and determine whether the technology can deliver on its promises of trust and decentralization. Ultimately, what defines us will not be MEV—but our choices.