Author: Prathik Desai Source: tokendispatch Translation: Shan Ouba, Jinse Finance
In 1719, Scottish gambler and monetary theorist John Law persuaded the French Regent to allow him to build a system to package highly illiquid colonial assets into negotiable paper instruments. He founded the Mississippi Company, monopolizing trade with French Louisiana, a vast territory mostly swampy.
Law packaged these illiquid colonial interests into gold-convertible company stocks. Ordinary Parisians flocked to them. A year later, this scheme made him the richest man in Europe and appointed him as the French Finance Minister. However, this was only temporary.
What happens when you hold gold-convertible stocks? You wait for the price to rise and then demand your gold back. That's exactly what investors did. A redemption frenzy began; they wanted their gold back.
However, gold was simply not enough. Law's solution was to change the rules. He limited the amount of gold each person could hold, decreed the devaluation of securities, and mandated that stocks could only be sold through his bank at prices he set. Each intervention bought him only a few more weeks, but utterly destroyed trust. By 1720, investors' equity certificates had become worthless. After dragging France into the Mississippi Bubble, Law fled the country in panic.

Chaos ensued on Rue Campanile in Paris during the Mississippi Bubble of 1720
Three centuries later, the world's top private lending funds have reacted in almost identical ways to a surge in investor redemptions: they have modified their redemption rules to control losses. But is this truly a solution, or just a band-aid? Can on-chain private lending help? In today's in-depth analysis, I will explore this question. Let's begin.
... From Birth to Redemption Crisis Private lending refers to lending outside of banks and public markets. Companies borrow directly from specialized funds managed by institutions such as Blackstone, Apollo, and Blue Owl, rather than from banks or by issuing bonds. Borrowers are typically mid-sized companies that are not yet eligible for public listing. This market was virtually nonexistent twenty years ago. Today, it exceeds $3 trillion and is projected to reach $5 trillion by 2029. The industry filled the gap left by the 2008 financial crisis, as regulatory and capital requirements significantly increased the cost for banks to hold high-risk loans. Private lending attracts investors with higher returns than public markets (8%–10%), at the cost of locked-up liquidity. Investors' funds can be locked up for years. This is precisely its core selling point: compared to traditional syndicated loans, it offers businesses greater flexibility and convenience; in return, investors receive an illiquidity premium due to the long-term inability to access their funds. Subsequently, the industry decided to change the rules. They wanted to attract retail investors, either to offer more attractive returns or to expand the private lending market. In response, the U.S. Congress created the Business Development Corporation (BDC) under the Investment Company Act of 1980. For decades, BDCs remained a niche product until institutions like Apollo, Blackstone, and Blue Owl launched unlisted versions of BDCs, specifically targeting retail investors and high-net-worth individuals. These instruments packaged illiquid corporate loans but included quarterly redemption windows to appease retail investors. Retail investors bought these products, ignoring a major structural flaw: the private lending industry promised liquidity, but the underlying loans remained illiquid. If the credit cycle overheated and retail investors redeemed their funds en masse, funds issuing these retail-packaged products would be in dire straits. So they set a 5% redemption cap. To fund managers, this seemed to solve the problem. But what happens when the market crashes and redemption demand exceeds the 5% cap? The inevitable finally happened. In September 2025, two major crashes completely shattered retail investors' confidence in private lending. First, auto parts supplier Brands Group filed for bankruptcy. The reason was that the loan agreement failed to discover and disclose off-balance-sheet hidden liabilities. Lenders underwrote it as a 5x leveraged acquisition, but the actual leverage was close to 20x. Another subprime auto lender, Tricolor Holdings, was accused of double-mortgaging the same collateral. After the truth came out, redemption demand surged. This led top private lending fund managers to begin using their discretion to modify rules or suspend redemptions. These coping mechanisms all bear the hallmarks of John Law. When a crisis strikes, they either lock out redemptions or tamper with the rules. What truly worries me is that suspending redemptions and arbitrarily changing the rules are double-edged swords. For investors, this sends a signal that the terms they agree to are negotiable and will only be changed in a way that benefits the fund. Investors are left at the mercy of fund managers—tightening redemption limits, or even completely suspending or restructuring payments. Even more unfair is that these changes are made after funds have already been invested. This completely violates the spirit of any contract signed by both parties. For fund managers, they will start to become conservative. A fund constantly facing redemption pressure cannot confidently allocate funds and will only start hoarding cash instead of lending. Is on-chain private lending the solution? People may tout the advantages of on-chain private lending: displaying numbers on a tokenized dashboard, the total value locked in a private lending protocol. But most of these are just new packaging for traditional private lending. Why do I say this? The facts are as follows: The core unique value of on-chain private lending lies in its ability to execute various financial primitives through smart contracts. Contracts can set withdrawal limits, collateral ratios, and allocation rules in the code. While on-chain private lending funds cannot promise higher liquidity than traditional funds, they can ensure that once funds are invested, no fund manager can unilaterally modify the contract terms. There will be no board vote to increase the tender offer ratio, nor will there be a sudden change from quarterly redemptions to capital return distributions, as seen with Blue Owl. The code will execute as is, regardless of managerial intent or market conditions. Smart contract-driven private lending funds can also solve the problem of double-collateralization. The collapse of Tricolor was due to multiple loans using the same collateral. Tokenized collateral generates a unique, auditable record, with one set of tokens corresponding to one set of equity. This structurally reduces the possibility of double-collateralization. First Brands was valued at face value by a private lending fund just months before its bankruptcy. On-chain, every transaction and repayment is visible in real time. There is no self-reported valuation to mislead investors. If the on-chain market valuation is 60 cents, the asset cannot be priced at 100 cents. If on-chain credit tokens are traded on the secondary market, more efficient price discovery can be achieved. This solves the pricing mismatch between the net asset value of unlisted BDCs and the underlying loans. We've already seen this with hedge funds Saba Capital and Cox Capital: they've made tender offers to acquire Blue Owl shares at 20%–35% below net asset value. Various protocols are already building this infrastructure. Maple Finance operates an institutional credit pool managing $3 billion in assets. Apollo partnered with Securitize to launch a tokenized sub-fund. WisdomTree introduced on-chain net asset value data to its private credit fund via Chainlink oracles. The infrastructure is ready. However, all of this infrastructure fails to address one problem: it cannot assess whether a borrower will repay a loan, nor can it assess whether a mid-sized software company can survive the disruptive changes brought about by artificial intelligence. As the cases of First Brands and Tricolor show, underwriting problems caused by human error can be minimized, but not completely eliminated, through on-chain records. However, another, larger problem is that most business processes, including maintaining financial statements, supplier contract records, and balance sheets, exist entirely off-chain. Smart contracts cannot inspect borrowers' books or verify their financial statements. Even if some protocol exists to put this data on-chain for verification, businesses will not agree to publicly disclose their financial and other sensitive business details on a public blockchain. Therefore, under the current infrastructure, fully on-chain underwriting is simply impossible. Blockchain currently offers a range of different trade-offs. But failures in private lending through DeFi channels can be more severe than those in the traditional private lending industry. Imagine a fund whose assets are constantly depreciating while redemptions are constantly increasing. For this fund, the DeFi ecosystem, eager to obtain high returns from real-world assets, is undoubtedly an ideal target. Investors seeking redemptions and fund managers seeking new sources of funding are highly motivated to tokenize these loans and sell them in on-chain liquidity pools. DeFi can easily become a dumping ground for illiquid and problematic products from traditional markets. We see this in the case of Goldfinch, a pioneer in on-chain lending: a borrower made an unauthorized, massive inter-company transfer that threatened the entire company's operations. Tokenization can only reveal the consequences of such events, not prevent fraud. There are also counterarguments. On-chain secondary markets can provide liquidity for distressed assets and help with more reasonable pricing. However, the line between market function and exit liquidity venues is very blurred and prone to collapse. As long as key information such as borrower qualifications, contract validity, and financial reports remain off-chain, on-chain lending cannot solve the problems of traditional industries; it will only introduce a series of new problems. If mainstream on-chain protocols channel hundreds of millions of dollars in DeFi deposits to loans with defaults or weak underlying assets, the damage will spread to multiple protocols. On-chain private lending is still in its infancy. Currently, the total active blockchain-native lending across all protocols amounts to only $3 billion, while the traditional private lending industry is worth a staggering $3 trillion. A single high-profile default could set back the entire concept of real-world asset-based lending by years. If on-chain private lending is to transcend the glamorous facade of traditional private lending, it must first address the issue of trust before it can address the issue of returns. This includes third-party verification of the underlying collateral, rather than relying on information self-reported by the originator. Furthermore, standardized risk disclosure mechanisms should be adopted, translating duration and credit risk into terminology that DeFi participants can understand and value. It should even include credit ratings of on-chain instruments by traditional institutions, which Maple Finance CEO Sidney Powell anticipates will be implemented by the end of 2026. It should also include a framework capable of detecting and preventing originators from dumping bad assets into on-chain liquidity pools. Without these measures, the convergence of risks from traditional finance and decentralized finance will become exploitation rather than a combination.